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Abstract
In this paper we explore several contexts where an adver-
sary has an upper hand over the defender by using special
hardware in an attack. These include password processing,
hard-drive protection, cryptocurrency mining, resource sharing,
code obfuscation, etc.
We suggest memory-hard computing as a generic
paradigm, where every task is amalgamated with a certain
procedure requiring intensive access to RAM both in terms
of size and (very importantly) bandwidth, so that transferring
the computation to GPU, FPGA, and even ASIC brings little
or no cost reduction. Cryptographic schemes that run in this
framework become egalitarian in the sense that both users and
attackers are equal in the price-performance ratio conditions.
Based on existing schemes like Argon2 and the recent
generalized-birthday proof-of-work, we suggest a generic
framework and two new schemes:
• MTP, a memory-hard Proof-of-Work based on the
memory-hard function with fast verification and short
proofs. It can be also used for memory-hard time-lock
puzzles.
• MHE, the concept of memory-hard encryption, which
utilizes available RAM to strengthen the encryption
for the low-entropy keys (allowing to bring back 6
letter passwords).
Keywords: MTP, MHE, Argon2, memory-hard, asymmet-
ric, proof-of-work, botnets, encryption, time-lock puzzles.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Historically attackers have had more resources than de-
fenders, which is still mostly true. Whether it is secret key
recovery or document forgery, the attackers are ready to spend
tremendous amount of computing power to achieve the goal.
In some settings it is possible to make most attacks infeasible
by simply setting the key length to 128 bits and higher. In
other settings the secret is limited and the best the defender
can do is to increase the time needed for the attack, but not to
render the attack impossible.
Passwords, typically stored in a hashed form, are a classical
example. As people tend to choose passwords of very low
entropy, the security designers added unique salts and then in-
creased the number of hash iterations. In response the attackers
switched to dedicated hardware for password cracking, so that
the price of single password recovery dropped dramatically,
sometimes by a few orders of magnitude. A similar situation
occurred in other contexts. The Bitcoin cryptocurrency relies
on continuous preimage search for the SHA-256 hash function,
which is much cheaper on custom ASICs, consuming up to
30,000 times less energy per solution than most efficient x86
laptops [2]. Eventually, the original concept of an egalitarian
cryptocurrency [25] vanished with the emergence of huge and
centralized mining pools. Related problems include password-
based key derivation for hard-drive encryption, where the data
confidentiality directly depends on the password entropy, and
where offline attack is exceptionally easy once the drive is
stolen. Similar situation arise in the resource sharing and spam
countermeasures. In the latter it is proposed that every user
presents a certain proof (often called proof-of-work), which
should be too expensive for spammers to generate on a large
scale. Yet another setting is that of code obfuscation, in which
powerful reverse-engineering/de-compilation tools can be used
in order to lift the proprietary code or secrets embedded in the
software.
B. Egalitarian computing
Our idea is to remedy the disparity between ordinary users
and adversaries/cheaters, where latter could use botnets, GPU,
FPGA, ASICs to get an advantage and run a cheaper attack.
We call it egalitarian computing as it should establish the same
price for a single computation unit on all platforms, so that the
defender’s hardware is optimal both for attack and defence.
Equipped with egalitarian crypto schemes, defenders may hope
to become to be on par with the most powerful attackers.
The key element of our approach is large (in size) and
intensive (in bandwidth) use of RAM as a widely available and
rather cheap unit for most defenders. In turn, RAM is rather
expensive on FPGA and ASIC1, and slow on GPU, at least
compared to memoryless computing tasks. All our schemes
use a lot of memory and a lot of bandwidth — almost as
much as possible.
We suggest a single framework for this concept and con-
crete schemes with an unique combination of features.
In the future, adoption of our concept could allow a
homogenization of computing resources, a simplified security
analysis, and relaxed security requirements. When all attackers
use the same hardware as defenders, automated large-scale
attacks are no longer possible. Shorter keys, shorter passwords,
faster and more transparent schemes may come back to use.
1The memory effect on ASICs can be illustrated as follows. A compact 50-
nm DRAM implementation [17] takes 500 mm2 per GB, which is equivalent
to about 15000 10 MHz SHA-256 cores in the best Bitcoin 40-nm ASICs [1]
and is comparable to a CPU size. Therefore, an algorithm requiring 1 GB for
1 minute would have the same AT cost as an algorithm requiring 242 hash
function calls, whereas the latter can not finish on a PC even in 1 day. In
other words, the use of memory can increase the AT cost by a factor of 1000
and more at the same time cost for the desktop user.
a) Related work: The idea of extensive memory use in
the context of spam countermeasures dates back at least to
2003 [5], [13] and was later refined in [15]. Fast memory-
intensive hash functions were proposed first by Percival in
2009 [27] an later among the submissions of the Password
Hashing Competition. Memory-intensive proofs-of-work have
been studied both in theory [16] and practice [6], [32].
b) Paper structure: We describe the goals of our con-
cept and give a high level overview in Section II. Then we
describe existing applications where this approach is implicitly
used: password hashing and cryptocurrency proofs of work
(Section III). We present our own progress-free Proof-of-Work
MTP with fast verification, which can also serve as a memory-
hard time-lock puzzle, in Section IV. The last Section V
is devoted to the novel concept of memory-hard encryption,
where we present our scheme MHE aimed to increase the
security of password-based disk encryption.
II. EGALITARIAN COMPUTING AS FRAMEWORK
A. Goal
Our goal is to alter a certain function H in order to
maximize its computational cost on the most efficient archi-
tecture – ASICs, while keeping the running time on the native
architecture (typically x86) the same. We ignore the design
costs due to nontransparent prices, but instead estimate the
running costs by measuring the time-area product [8], [31].
On ASICs the memory size M translates into certain area A.
The ASIC running time T is determined by the length of the
longest computational chain and by the ASIC memory latency.
Suppose that an attacker wants to compute H using only
a fraction αM of memory for some α < 1. Using some
tradeoff specific to H, he has to spend C(α) times as much
computation and his running time increases by the factor D(α)
(here C(α) may exceed D(α) as the attacker can parallelize
the computation). In order to fit the increased computation into
time, the attacker has to place C(α)D(α) additional cores on chip.
Therefore, the time-area product changes from AT1 to ATα as
ATα = A · (α+ βC(α)
D(α)
)T ·D(α) = AT1(αD(α) + C(α)β),
(1)
where β is the fraction of the original memory occupied by
a single computing core. If the tradeoff requires significant
communication between the computing cores, the memory
bandwidth limit Bwmax may also increase the running time.
In practice we will have D(α) ≥ C(α) · Bw/Bwmax, where
Bw is the bandwidth for α = 1.
Definition 1: We call function F memory-hard (w.r.t. M )
if any algorithm A that computes H using αM memory has
the computation-space tradeoff C(α) where C() is at least a
superlinear function of 1/α.
It is known [19] that any function whose computation is
interpreted as a directed acyclic graph with T vertices of
constant in-degree, can be computed using O( Tlog T ) space,
where the constant in O() depends on the degree. However,
for concrete hash functions very few tradeoff strategies have
been published, for example [9].
B. Framework
Our idea is to combine a certain computation H with a
memory-hard function F . This can be done by modifying H
using input from F (amalgamation) or by transforming its
code to an equivalent one (obfuscation).
The amalgamation is used as follows. The execution of
H is typically a sequence of smaller steps Hi, i < T , which
take the output Vi−1 from the previous step and produce the
next output Vi. For our purpose we need another primitive, a
memory-hard function F , which fills the memory with some
blocks X[i], i < T . We suggest combining H with F , for
example like:
H′ = H ′T ◦H ′T−1 ◦ · · · ◦H ′1,
where
H ′i(Vi−1) = H(Vi−1 ⊕X[i− 1]).
Depending on the application, we may also modify X[i] as
a function of Vi−1 so that it is impossible to precompute F .
The idea is that any computation of H′ should use T blocks
of memory, and if someone wants to use less, the memory-
hardness property would impose computational penalties on
him. This approach will also work well for any code that uses
nonces or randomness produced by PRNG. PRNG could then
be replaced by (or intermixed with the output of) F .
The obfuscation principle works as follows. Consider a
compiler producing an assembly code for some functionH. We
make it to run a memory-hard function F on a user-supplied
input I (password) and produce certain number of memory
blocks. For each if-statement of the form
if x then A
else B
the compiler computes a memory-hard bit bi which is
extracted from the block X[i] (the index can also depend on
the statement for randomization) and alters the statement as
if x⊕ bi then A
else B
for bi = 0 and
if x⊕ bi then B
else A
for bi = 1. This guarantees that the program will have to
run F at least once (the bits bi can be cached if this if-statement
is used multiple times, ex. in a loop).
Accessing the memory block from a random memory
location for each conditional statement in practice would slow
down the program too much, so compiler can perform a
tradeoff depending on the length of the program, the number
of conditional statements in it and according to a tunable
degree of required memory-hardness for a program. Memory-
hard bits could be mixed into opaque predicates or other code
obfuscation constructs like code-flattening logic.
We note that in order for a program to run correctly, the
user needs to supply correct password for F , even though the
source code of the program is public. A smart decompiler,
however, when supplied with the password, can obtain clean
version of the program by running F only once.
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Our schemes described in the further text use the amalga-
mation principle only, so we leave the research directions in
obfuscation for future work.
III. EGALITARIAN COMPUTING IN APPLICATIONS
In this section we outline several applications, where
memory-hard functions are actively used in order to achieve
egalitarian computing.
A. Password hashing with a memory-hard function
The typical setting for the password hashing is as follows.
A user selects a password P and submit it to the authentication
server with his identifier U . The server hashes P and unique
salt S with some function F , and stores (U, S, F (P, S)) in the
password file. The common threat is the password file theft,
so that an attacker can try the passwords from his dictionary
file D and check if any of them yields the stolen hash. The
unique S ensures that the hashes are tried one-by-one.
Following massive password cracking attacks that use spe-
cial hardware [23], [30], the security community initiated the
Password Hashing Competition [3] to select the hash function
that withstands the most powerful adversaries. The Argon2
hash function [10] has been recently selected as the winner.
We stress that the use of memory-hard function for password
hashing does not make the dictionary attacks infeasible, but it
makes them much more expensive in terms of the single trial
cost.
a) Definition and properties of Argon2: We use Argon2
in our new schemes described in Sections IV and V. Here we
outline the key elements of the Argon2 design that are used in
our scheme. For more details and their rationale we refer the
reader to [10].
Argon2 takes P , S, and possibly some additional data U
as inputs. It is parametrized by the memory size M , number
of iterations t, and the available parallelism l. It fills M
blocks of memory X[1], X[2], . . . , X[M ] (1 KB each) and then
overwrites them (t − 1) times. Each block X[i] is generated
using internal compression function F , which takes X[i − 1]
and X[φ(i)] as inputs. For t = 1 this works as follows, where
H is a cryptographic hash function (Blake2b).
X[1] = H(P, S);
X[i] = F (X[i− 1], X[φ(i)]), i > 1;
Out→ H(X[M ]).
(2)
The indexing function φ(i) is defined separately for each of
two versions of Argon2: 2d and 2i. The Argon2d version,
which we use, compute it as a function of the previous block
X[i− 1].
The authors proved [10] that all the blocks are generated
distinct assuming certain collision-resistant-like properties of
F . They also reported the performance of 0.7 cpb on the
Haswell CPU with 4 threads, and 1.6 cpb with 1 thread.
b) Tradeoff security of Argon2: Using the tradeoff
algorithm published in [9], the authors report the values C(α)
and D(α) up to α = 1/7 with t = 1. It appears that C(α) is
exponential in α, whereas D(α) is linear.
B. Proofs of work
A proof-of-work scheme is a challenge-response protocol,
where one party (Prover) has to prove (maybe probabilisti-
cally) that it has performed a certain amount of computation
following a request from another party (Verifier). It typically
relies on a computational problem where a solution is assumed
to have fixed cost, such as the preimage search in the Bitcoin
protocol and other cryptocurrencies. Other applications may
include spam protection, where a proof-of-work is a certificate
that is easy to produce for ordinary sender, but hard to generate
in large quantities given a botnet (or more sophisticated
platform).
The proof-of-work algorithm must have a few properties
to be suitable for cryptocurrencies:
• It must be amortization-free, i.e. producing q outputs
for B should be q times as expensive;
• The solution must be short enough and verified
quickly using little memory in order to prevent DoS
attacks on the verifier.
• The time-space tradeoffs must be steep to prevent any
price-performance reduction.
• The time and memory parameters must be tunable
independently to sustain constant mining rate.
• To avoid a clever prover getting advantage over the
others the advertised algorithm must be the most
efficient algorithm to date (optimization-freeness).
• The algorithm must be progress-free to prevent cen-
tralization: the mining process must be stochastic so
that the probability to find a solution grows steadily
with time and is non-zero for small time periods.
• Parallelized implementations must be limited by the
memory bandwidth.
As demonstrated in [11], almost any hard problem can be
turned into a proof-of-work, even though it is difficult to fulfill
all these properties. The well-known hard and NP-complete
problems are natural candidates, since the best algorithms for
them run in (sub)exponential time, whereas the verification is
polynomial. The proof-of-work scheme Equihash [11] is built
on the generalized-birthday, or k-XOR, problem, which looks
for a set of n-bit strings that XOR to zero. The best existing
algorithm is due to Wagner [34]. This problem is particularly
interesting, as the time-space tradeoff steepness can be adjusted
by changing k, which does not hold, e.g., in hard knapsacks.
a) Drawbacks of existing PoW: We briefly discuss
existing alternatives here. The first PoW schemes by Dwork
and Naor [14] were just computational problems with fast
verification such as the square root computation, which do
α 12
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
C(α) 1.5 4 20.2 344 4660 218
D(α) 1.5 2.8 5.5 10.3 17 27
TABLE I. TIME AND COMPUTATION PENALTIES FOR THE RANKING
TRADEOFF ATTACK FOR ARGON2D.
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not require large memory explicitly. The simplest scheme
of this kind is Hashcash [7], where a partial preimage to a
cryptographic hash function is found (the so called difficulty
test). Large memory comes into play in [13], where a random
array is shared between the prover and the verifier thus allow-
ing only large-memory verifiers. This condition was relaxed
in [15], where superconcentrators [28] are used to generate
the array, but the verifier must still hold large memory in
the initialization phase. Superconcentrators were later used
in the Proof-of-Space construction [16], which allows fast
verification. However, the scheme [16] if combined with the
difficulty test is vulnerable to cheating (see Section IV-D for
more details) and thus can not be converted to a progress-free
PoW. We note that the superconcentrators make both [15] and
[16] very slow.
Ad-hoc but faster schemes started with scrypt [27], but
fast verification is possible only with rather low amount of
memory. Using more memory (say, using Argon2 [10]) with a
difficulty test but verifying only a subset of memory is prone
to cheating as well (Section IV-D).
The scheme [11] is quite promising, but the reference
implementation reported is quite slow, as it takes about 30
seconds to get a proof that certifies the memory allocation
of 500 MB. As a result, the algorithm is not truly progress-
free: the probability that the solution is found within the first
few seconds is actually zero. It can be argued that this would
stimulate centralization among the miners. In addition, the
memory parameter does not have sufficient granularity and
there is no correlation between the allocated memory and the
minimal time needed to find the proof.
Finally, we mention schemes Momentum [21] and Cuckoo
cycle [32], which provide fast verification due to their combi-
natorial nature. They rely on the memory requirements for the
collision search (Momentum) or graph cycle finding (Cuckoo).
However, Momentum is vulnerable to a sublinear time-space
tradeoff [11], whereas the first version of the Cuckoo scheme
was recently broken in [6].
We summarize the properties of the existing proof-of-work
constructions in Table II. The AT cost is estimated for the
parameters that enable 1-second generation time on a PC.
IV. MTP: PROOFS OF WORK AND TIME-LOCK PUZZLES
BASED ON MEMORY-HARD FUNCTION
In this section we present a novel proof-of-work algorithm
MTP (for Merkle Tree Proof) with fast verification, which
in particular solves the progress-free problem of [11]. Our
approach is based on the memory-hard function, and the
concrete proposal involves Argon2.
Since fast memory-hard functions F such as Argon2 per-
form a lengthy chain of computations, but do not solve any
NP-like problem, it is not fast to verify that Y is the output of
F . Checking some specific (say, last) blocks does not help,
as explained in detail in the further text. We thus have to
design a scheme that lower bounds the time-area product for
the attacker, even if he computes a slightly modified function.
A. Description of MTP
Consider a memory-hard function F that satisfies Equa-
tion (2) (for instance, Argon2) with a single pass over the
memory producing T blocks and a cryptographic hash function
H (possibly used in F). We propose the following non-
interactive protocol for the Prover (Figure 1) in Algorithm 1,
where L and d are security parameters. The average number
of calls to F is T + 2dL.
Algorithm 1 MTP: Merkle-tree based Proof-of-Work. Prover’s
algorithm
Input: Challenge I , parameters L, d.
1) Compute F(I) and store its T blocks X[1], X[2],
. . ., X[T ] in the memory.
2) Compute the root Φ of the Merkle hash tree (see
Appendix A).
3) Select nonce N .
4) Compute Y0 = H(Φ, N) where G is a cryptographic
hash function.
5) For 1 ≤ j ≤ L:
ij = Yj−1 (mod T );
Yj = H(Yj−1, X[ij ]).
6) If YL has d trailing zeros, then (Φ, N,Z) is the
proof-of-work, where Z is the opening of 2L blocks
{X[ij − 1], X[φ(ij)]}. Otherwise go to Step 3.
Output: Proof (Φ, N,Z).
I
Argon2
Φ
Merkle tree
N
H
Nonce
i1
H
i1
iL
H
iL
Y
d trailing zeros?
No Yes
Open 2L blocks
Fig. 1. MTP: Merkle-tree based Proof-of-Work with light verification.
The verifier, equipped with F and H , runs Algorithm 2.
B. Cheating strategies
Let the computation-space tradeoff for H and the default
memory value T be given by functions C(α) and D(α)
(Section II).
a) Memory savings: Suppose that a cheating prover
wants to reduce the AT cost by using αT memory for some
α < 1. First, he computes F(I) and Φ, making C(α)T calls to
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Scheme AT cost Speed Verification Tradeoff Parallelism Progress-free
Fast Memoryless
Dwork-Naor I [14] Low High Yes Yes Memoryless Yes Yes
Dwork-Naor II [13] High Low Yes No Memoryless Constrained Yes
Dwork-Naor III [15] Medium Low Yes No Exponential Constrained Yes
Hashcash/Bitcoin [7] Low High Yes Yes Memoryless Yes Yes
Proof-of-Space [16]+Diff.test High Low Yes Yes Exponential No No
Litecoin (scrypt-128KB+Diff.test) Medium High Yes Yes Linear No Yes
Argon2-1GB + Diff.test High High No No Exponential No Yes
Momentum [21] Medium [33] High Yes Yes Sublinear [11], [33] Yes Yes
Cuckoo cycle [32] Medium [6] Medium Yes Yes Linear [6] Yes Yes
Equihash [11] High Medium Yes Yes Exponential Constrained Yes
MTP High High Yes Yes Exponential Constrained Yes
TABLE II. REVIEW OF EXISTING PROOFS OF WORK.
Algorithm 2 MTP: Verifier’s algorithm
Input: Proof (Φ, N,Z), parameters L, d.
1) Compute Y0 = H(Φ, N).
2) Verify all block openings using Φ.
3) Compute from Z for 1 ≤ j ≤ L:
X[ij ] = F (X[ij − 1], X[φ(ij)]);
Yj = G(Yj−1, X[ij ]).
4) Check whether YL has t trailing zeros.
Output: Yes/No.
F . Then for each N he has to get or recompute L blocks using
only αT stored blocks. The complexity of this step is equal
to the complexity of recomputing random L blocks during
the first computation of F . A random block is recomputed
by a tree of average size C(α) and depth D(α). Therefore,
to compute the proof-of-work, a memory-saving prover has to
make C(α)(T +2dL) calls to F , so his amount of work grows
by C(α).
b) Block modification: The second cheating strategy is
to compute a different function F ′ 6= F . More precisely, the
cheater produces some blocks X[i′] (which we call incon-
sistent as in [16]) not as specified by Equation (2) (e.g. by
simply computing X[i′] = H(i′)). In contrast to the verifiable
computation approach, our protocol allows a certain number of
inconsistent blocks. Suppose that the number of inconsistent
blocks is T , then the chance that no inconsistent block is
detected by L opened blocks is
γ = (1− )L.
Therefore, the probability for a proof-of-work with M incon-
sistent blocks to pass the opening test is γ. In other words, the
cheater’s time is increased by the factor 1/γ. We note that it
does not make sense to alter the blocks after the Merkle tree
computation, as any modified block would fail the opening
test.
c) Overall cheating penalties: Let us accumulate the
two cheating strategies into one. Suppose that a cheater stores
αT blocks and additionally allows T inconsistent blocks.
Then he makes at least
C(α+ )(T + 2dL)
γ
(3)
calls to F . The concrete values are determined by the penalty
function C(), which depends on F .
C. Parallelism
Both honest prover and cheater can parallelize the compu-
tation for 2t different nonces. However, the latency of cheater’s
computation will be higher, since each block generates a
recomputation tree of average depth D(α+ ).
D. Why simpler approach does not work: grinding attack
Now we can explain in more details why the composition
of F and the difficulty test is not a good proof-of-work even
if some internal blocks of H are opened. Suppose that the
proof is accepted if H(X[T ]) has certain number d of trailing
zeros. One would expect that a prover has to try 2d distinct
I on average and thus call F 2t times to find a solution.
However, a cheating prover can simply try 2d values for X[T ]
and find one that passes the test in just 2d calls to H . Although
X[T ] is now inconsistent, it is unlikely to be selected among
L blocks to open, so the cheater escapes detection easily.
Additionally checking X[T ] would not resolve the problem
since a cheater would then modify the previous block, or
X[φ(T )], or an earlier block and then propagate the changes.
A single inconsistent block is just too difficult to catch2.
E. MTP-Argon2
As a concrete application, we suggest a cryptocurrency
proof-of-work based on Argon2d with 4 parallel lanes. We
aim to make this PoW unattractive for botnets, so we suggest
using 2 GB of RAM, which is very noticeable (and thus would
likely alarm the user), while being bearable for the regular user,
who consciously decided to use his desktop for mining. On our
1.8 GHz machine a single call to 2-GB Argon2d runs in 0.5
seconds, but the Merkle tree computation is more expensive,
as we have to hash 2 GB of data splitted into 1 KB blocks. We
suggest using Blake2b for H , as it is already used in Argon2d,
but restrict to 128-bit output, so that the total running time is
about 3 seconds. In this case a single opening has 16 ·21 bytes
of hashes, or 1.3 KB in total.
2We have not seen any formal treatment of this attack in the literature, but
it appears to be known in the community. It is mentioned in [26] and [4].
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We suggest L = 70, so that the entire proof consists of 140
blocks and their openings, or 180 KB in total. Let us figure out
the cheating advantage. The C() and D() functions are given
in Table I). Assuming certain ratio between the area needed to
implement Blake2b and the area needed for DRAM, we get
the following lower bound on the ASIC-equipped cheater.
Proposition 1: For L = 70 and 2 GB of RAM the time-
area product can be reduced by the factor of 12 at most,
assuming that each Blake2b core occupies an equivalent of
216 bytes.
Proof: Assuming that each core occupies 216 bytes, we
obtain β = 2−15 in terms of Equation (1). Since the cheater
has the success chance γ = (1− )L, Equation (1) is modified
as follows:
ATα = AT1
αD(α+ ) + C(α+ )/215
(1− )L . (4)
Consider three options:
• α,  < 1/12. Then C(α+ ) ≥ 4660 (Table I) and we
have
ATα ≥ AT1 · 4660
32768
≥ AT1 · 0.12.
• α < 1/12, 1/6 ≥  > 1/12. Then C(α + ) ≥ 20,
(1− )L > 1/441, and we have
ATα ≥ AT1 · 20 · 441
32768
≥ AT1 · 0.27.
• α < 1/12, 1/6 ≤ . Then (1 − )L > 215, and the
time-area product increases.
• α > 1/12. Then ATα ≥ AT1 · 1/12.
This ends the proof.
We conclude that a cheater can gain at most 12x-advantage,
whereas he can still be detected in the future by memory-rich
verifiers. Tradeoffs are also not helpful when implementing
this Proof-of-Work on ASIC. Altogether, our proposal should
reduce the relative efficiency of potential ASIC mining rigs
and allow more egalitarian mining process. Even if someone
decides to use large botnets (10,000 machines and more), all
the botnets machines would have to use the same 2 GB of
memory, otherwise they would suffer large penalty. We note
that if  = 0, i.e. the prover is honest, then his maximal
advantage is max 1αD(α) ≤ 2.
F. MTP as a tool for time-lock puzzles and timestamping
The paradigm of inherently sequential computation was
developed by [12] in the application to CPU benchmarking
and [29] for timestamping, i.e. to certify that the document
was generated certain amount of time in the past. Rivest et al.
suggested time-lock puzzles for this purpose. In our context,
a time-lock puzzle solution is a proof-of-work that has lower
bound on the running time assuming unlimited parallelism.
The verifier in [20], [29] selects a prime product N = pq
and asks the prover to compute the exponent 22
D
(mod N)
fpr some D ≈ N . It is conjectured that the prover who
does not know the factors can not exponentiate faster than
do D consecutive squarings. In turn, the verifier can verify the
solution by computing the exponent 2D modulo φ(N), which
takes log(D) time. So far the conjecture has not been refuted,
but the scheme inherently requires a secret held by the verifier,
and thus is not suitable for proofs-of-work without secrets, as
in cryptocurrencies.
Time-lock puzzles without secrets were suggested by Mah-
moody et al. [22]. Their construction is a graph of hash
computations, which is based on depth-robust graphs similarly
to [16]. The puzzle is a deterministic graph such that removing
any constant fraction of nodes keeps its depth above the con-
stant fraction of the original one (so the parallel computation
time is lower bounded). A Merkle tree is put atop of it with its
root determining a small number of nodes to open. Therefore,
a cheater who wants to compute the graph in less time has to
subvert too many nodes and is likely to be caught. As [16],
the construction by Mahmoody et al., if combined with the
difficulty filter, is subject to the grinding attack described
above.
The MTP-Argon2 construction can be viewed as a time-
lock puzzle and an improvement over these schemes. First,
the difficulty filter is explicitly based on the grinding attack,
which makes it a legitimate way to solve the puzzle. Secondly,
it is much faster due to high speed of Argon2d. The time-lock
property comes from the fact that the computation chain can
not be parallelized as the graph structure is not known before
the computation.
Suppose that MTP-Argon2 is parallelized by the additional
factor of R so that each core computes a chain of length
about T/R. Let core j compute j-th (out of R) chain,
chronologically. Then bu step i each core has computed i
blocks and has not computed T/R−i blocks, so the probability
that core j requests a block that has not been computed is
(j − 1)(T/R− i)
(j − 1)T/R+ i ≤
(j − 1)(T/R− i)
jT/R
.
Summing by all i, we obtain that core j misses at least
T (1−1/j)
2R , so the total fraction of inconsistent blocks is about
0.5− lnR2R . Therefore,  quickly approaches 0.5, which is easily
detectable. We thus conclude that a parallel implementation of
MTP-Argon2 is likely to fail the Merkle tree verification.
V. MEMORY-HARD ENCRYPTION ON LOW-ENTROPY KEYS
A. Motivation
In this section we approach standard encryption from the
memory-hardness perspective. A typical approach to hard-
drive encryption is to derive the master key from the user
password and then use it to encrypt chunks of data in a certain
mode of operation such as XTS [24]. The major threat, as
to other password-based security schemes, are low-entropy
passwords. An attacker, who gets access to the hard drive
encrypted with such password, can determine the correct key
and then decrypt within short time.
A countermeasure could be to use a memory-hard function
for the key derivation, so that the trial keys can be produced
only on memory-rich machines. However, the trial decryption
could still be performed on special memoryless hardware given
these keys. We suggest a more robust scheme which covers
this type of adversaries and eventually requires that the entire
attack code have permanent access to large memory.
6
B. Requirements
We assume the following setting, which is inspired by
typical disk-encryption applications. The data consists of mul-
tiple chunks Q ∈ Q, which can be encrypted and decrypted
independently. The only secret that is available to the encryp-
tion scheme E is the user-input password P ∈ P , which has
sufficiently low entropy to be memorized (e.g., 6 lowercase
symbols). The encryption syntax is then as follows:
E : P × S ×Q → C,
where S ∈ S is associated data, which may contain salt,
encryption nonce or IV, chunk identifier, time, and other
secondary input; and C ∈ C is ciphertext. S serves both to
simplify ciphertext identification (as it is public) and to ensure
certain cryptographic properties. For instance, unique salt or
nonce prevents repetition of ciphertexts for identical plaintexts.
We note that in some settings due to storage restriction the
latter requirement can be dropped. Decryption then is naturally
defined and we omit its formal syntax.
In our proposal we do not restrict the chunk size. Even
though it can be defined for chunks as small as disk sectors, the
resistance to cracking attacks will be higher for larger chunks,
up to a megabyte long.
A typical attack setting is as follows. An attacker obtains
the encrypted data via some malicious channel or installs
malware and then tries different passwords to decrypt it. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that the plaintext contains
sufficient redundancy so that a successful guess can be iden-
tified easily. Therefore, the adversary tries D passwords from
his dictionary D ⊂ P . Let T be the time needed for the
fastest decryption operation that provides partial knowledge
of plaintext sufficient to discard or remember the password,
and A0 be the chip area needed to implement this operation.
Then the total amount of work performed by the adversary is
W = D · T ·A0.
At the same time, the time to encrypt T ′ for a typical user
should not be far larger than T . Our goal is to maximize W
with keeping T ′ the same or smaller.
The memory-hard functions seem to serve perfectly for
the purpose of maximizing W . However, it remains unclear
how to combine such function F with E to get memory-hard
encryption (MHE).
Now we formulate some additional features that should be
desirable for such a scheme:
• The user should be able to choose the requested
memory size A independently of the chunk length |Q|.
Whereas the chunk length can be primarily determined
by the CPU cache size, desirable processing speed, or
the hard drive properties, the memory size determines
the scheme’s resistance to cracking attacks.
• The memory can be allocated independently for each
chunk or reused. In the former case the user can not
allocate too much memory as the massive decryption
would be too expensive. However, for the amounts of
memory comparable to the chunk size the memory-
hard decryption should take roughly as much as
memoryless decryption. If the allocated memory is
reused for distinct chunks, much more memory can
be allocated as the allocation time can be amortized.
However, the decryption latency would be quite high.
We present both options in the further text.
• Full ciphertext must be processed to decrypt a single
byte. This property clearly makes T larger since the
adversary would have to process an entire chunk
to check the password. At the same time, for disk
encryption it should be fine to decrypt in the “all-or-
nothing” fashion, as the decryption time would still be
smaller than the user could wait.
• Encryption should be done in one pass over data. It
might sound desirable that the decryption should be
done in one pass too. However, this would contradict
the previous requirement. Indeed, if the decryption
can be done in one pass, then the first bytes of the
plaintext can be determined without the last bytes of
the ciphertext3.
• Apart from the memory parameter, the total time
needed to allocate this memory should be tunable too.
It might happen that the application does not have
sufficient memory but does have time. In this case,
the adversary can be slowed down by making several
passes over the memory during its initialization (the
memory-hard function that we consider support this
feature).
Our next and final requirement comes from adversary’s side.
When the malware is used, the incoming network connection
and memory for this malware can be limited. Thus, it would
be ideal for the attacker if the memory-intensive part can be
delegated to large machines under attacker’s control, such as
botnets. If we just derived the secret-key K for encryption as
the output of the memory-hard hash function F , this would be
exactly this case. An adversary would then run F for dictionary
D on his own machine, produce the set K of keys, and supply
them to malware (recall that due to low entropy there would
be only a handful of these keys). Thus the final requirement
should be the following:
• During decryption, it should be impossible to delegate
the entire memory-hard computation to the external
device without accessing the ciphertext. Therefore,
there could be no memory-hard precomputation.
C. Our scheme
Our scheme is based on a recent proposal by Za-
verucha [35], who addresses similar properties in the scheme
based on Rivest’s All-or-Nothing transform (ANT). However,
the scheme in [35] does not use an external memory-hard
function, which makes it memory requirements inevitably
bound to the chunk size. Small chunks but large memory is
impossible in [35].
Our proposal is again based on the All-or-Nothing trans-
formation, though we expect that similar properties can be
obtained with deterministic authenticated encryption scheme
as a core primitive. The chunk length q (measured in blocks
3The similar argument is made for the online authenticated ciphers in [18].
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using by F) and memory size M ≥ q are the parameters as
well as some blockcipher E (possibly AES). First, we outline
the scheme where the memory is allocated separately for each
chunk. The reader may also refer to Figure 2.
Algorithm 3 Memory-hard encryption with independent mem-
ory allocation (for each chunk).
Input: Password P , memory size M , associated data S, chunk
Q, number of iterations t, memory-hard function F (preferably
Argon2), blockcipher E, cryptographic hash function H (e.g.
SHA-3).
1) Run F on (P, S) with input parameters M and t
but fill only M − q blocks (the header) in the last
iteration. Let X0 be the last memory block produced
by F .
2) Produce K0 = H(X0) — the first session key.
3) Generate a random session key K1.
4) Generate the remaining blocks X1, X2, . . ., Xq
(body) for F as follows. We assume that each chunk
M consists of smaller blocks m1, m2, . . ., mq of
length equal to the block size of F . For each i ≥ 1:
• Encrypt Xi−1 by E in the ECB mode under
K1 and get the intermediate ciphertext block
C ′i.• Add the chunk data: C ′′i = C ′i ⊕mi.• Encrypt C ′′i under K0 in the CBC mode and
produce the final ciphertext block Ci.
• Modify the memory: Xi−1 ← Xi−1 ⊕ C ′′i .• Generate the block Xi according to the spec-
ification of F . In Argon2, the modified Xi−1
and some another block X[φ(Xi−1)] would
be used.
5) After the entire chunk is encrypted, encrypt also the
key K1 :
Ct+1 = EK0(H(Xt)⊕K1).
Output: C1, . . . , Ct+1.
The underlying idea is to use both the header and the body
blocks to produce the ciphertext. In tun, to recompute the body
blocks both the ciphertext and the header must be available
during trial decryption.
The version of the MHE scheme which allocates the same
memory for multiple chunks is very similar. The S input is
ignored at the beginning, so that the header memory blocks
do not depend on the data. Instead, we set K0 = H(X0, S),
so that the body blocks are affected by S and M , and thus are
different for every chunk. In this case the body blocks have
to be stored separately and should not overwrite the header
blocks for t > 1.
Let us verify that the scheme in Algorithm 3 satisfies the
properties we listed earlier:
• The allocated memory size M can be chosen indepen-
dently of the chunk length q (as long as M > q).
• The body memory blocks are allocated and processed
for each chunk independently. In addition, the header
blocks are also processed independently for each
chunk in the single-chunk version.
• In order to decrypt a single byte of the ciphertext,
an adversary would have to obtain K1, which can be
done only by running F up to the final block, which
requires all C ′′i , which are in turn must be derived
from the ciphertext blocks.
• Encryption needs one pass over data, and decryption
needs two passes over data.
• The total time needed to allocate and fill the header
is tunable.
• The computation of the body memory blocks dur-
ing decryption can not be delegated, as it requires
knowledge both of the header and the ciphertext. It
might be possible to generate the header on an external
machine, but then random access to its blocks to
decrypt the ciphertext is required.
We note that properties 1, 5, and 6 are not present in [35].
a) Security: First, we address traditional CPA security.
We do not outline the full proof here, just the basic steps. We
assume that the adversary does not have access to the internals
of Argon2, and that blockcipher E is a secure PRF. Next,
we assume collision-resistance of the compression function F
used in F . Given that, we prove that all the memory blocks
are distinct, which yields the CPA security for C ′. From the
latter we deduce the CPA security for the final ciphertext.
We note that in the case when the collision-resistance of
F can not be guaranteed, we may additionally require that
Xi undergo hashing by a cryptographic hash function H ′
before encryption, so that the plaintext blocks are still distinct.
All these properties hold up to the birthday bound of the
blockcipher.
Next, we figure out the tradeoff security. The genuine
decrypting user is supposed to spend M memory blocks for F
and q memory blocks to store the plaintext and intermediate
variables (if the ciphertext can be overwritten, then these q
blocks are not needed). Suppose that an adversary wants to use
αM memory for header and body. Then each missing block,
if asked during decryption, must be recomputed making C(α)
calls to F . The best such strategy for Argon2, described in [9],
yields C(α) that grows exponentially in 1/α. For example,
using 1/5 of memory, an adversary would have to make 344
times as many calls to F , which makes a memory-reducing
encryption cracking inefficient even on special hardware.
b) Performance: We suggest taking l = 4 in Argon2
in order to fill the header faster using multiple cores, which
reportedly takes 0.7 cpb (about the speed of AES-GCM and
AES-XTS). The body has to be filled sequentially as the
encryption process is sequential. As AES-CBC is about 1.3
cpb, and we use two of it, the body phase should run at
about 4 cpb. In a concrete setting, suppose that we tolerate
0.1 second decryption time (about 300 Mcycles) for the 1-MB
chunk. Then we can take the header as large as 256 MB, as it
would be processed in 170 Mcycles + 4 Mcycles for the body
phase.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the new paradigm of egalitarian com-
puting, which suggests amalgamating arbitrary computation
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Fig. 2. MHE: Disk encryption using memory-hard function Argon2.
with a memory-hard function to enhance the security against
off-line adversaries equipped with powerful tools (in particular
with optimized hardware). We have reviewed password hash-
ing and proofs of work as applications where such schemes
are already in use or are planned to be used. We then introduce
two more schemes in this framework. The first one is MTP,
the progress-free proof-of-work scheme with fast verification
based on the memory-hard function Argon2, the winner of the
Password Hashing Competition. The second scheme pioneers
the memory-hard encryption — the security enhancement for
password-based disk encryption, also based on Argon2.
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APPENDIX
We use Merkle hash trees in the following form. A prover
P commits to T blocks X[1], X[2], . . . , X[T ] by computing
the hash tree where the blocks X[i] are at leaves at depth log T
and nodes compute hashes of their branches. For instance, for
T = 4 and hash function G prover P computes and publishes
Φ = G(G(X[1], X[2]), G(X[3], X[4])).
Prover stores all blocks and all intermediate hashes. In order
to prove that he knows, say, X[5] for T = 8, (or to open it) he
discloses the hashes needed to reconstruct the path from X[5]
to Φ:
open(X[5]) = (X[5], X[6], g78 = G(X[7], X[8]),
g1234 = G(G(X[1], X[2]), G(X[3], X[4])),Φ),
so that the verifier can make all the computations. If G is
collision-resistant, it is hard to open any block in more than
one possible way.
10
